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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
HEIDI J. JUDD, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
CaseNo.20010646-SC

v.
GREGORY DREZGA, M.D.,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE - STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The Open Courts Clause, as interpreted by this Court, is in conflict with the
Separation of Powers provision of the Utah State Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its
legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. The State of Utah agrees with the plaintiffs that
the issue of whether the limitations on judgments statute violates various state
constitutional provisions was preserved below. Brief of the Appellants at 2.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of Utah (Amicus Curiae) agrees with, and adopts, the Statement of the
Case of the defendant Dr. Drezga as set out in his Brief of the Appellee.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Amicus Curiae agrees with, and adopts, the Statement of Facts of the
defendant Dr. Drezga as set out in his Brief of the Appellee.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The common law was not adopted by the State of Utah until two years after
statehood. At the time the Constitution of Utah was adopted, Utah did not recognize the
common law. Indeed, the territorial legislature had expressly rejected it. Even after the
adoption of the common law, Utah's law has always made it clear that legislative
enactments take priority over the common law. And yet, under this Court's interpretation
of the Open Court's Clause, the common law is constitutionalized and cannot be rejected
by the legislative branch of Utah's government except if clear social or economic evils
should require the alteration.
Such an interpretation of the Open Courts Clause conflicts with the guiding
principle of the Separation of Powers that is also found in our state constitution. By
denying the legislative branch the power to legislate contrary to judge-made law, the

2

courts have, in part, taken control of the core function of another independent branch of
state government. This Court should reject such an expansive interpretation of the Open
Courts Clause.
Nor should this Court treat the separate legislative branch of government as if it
were an inferior tribunal and require that it have "evidence" of record to support its public
policy decisions.
ARGUMENT
I. HISTORICALLY, THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE WAS MEANT
AS A RESTRICTION UPON THE JUDICIARY, AND NOT UPON
THE LEGISLATURE
Unlike many states, Utah does not have a history of accepting the common law
from earliest times. Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 18,1(132, 974
P.2d 1194 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). As correctly pointed out by Justice
Zimmerman, the early settlers of Utah were "hostile to the common law, lawyers, and
courts." Id. One of the earliest enactments of the territorial legislature of Utah was a
statute expressly rejecting the common law. Laws, Territory of Utah, ch. LXIV, 260 § 1
(1855). Part of this antipathy for the courts can be explained by the history of Utah's
judiciary.
Under the Poland Act, and other federal measures, Utah territorial courts had been
stripped of almost all of their powers. The remaining judiciary of the territory consisted
of federally appointed judges that were unwilling to work with the territorial legislature or

3

the majority of its citizens. Indeed, the first reported decision of the federal judiciary in
Utah (three federal district court judges acting together as a federal territorial supreme
court) declared that "federal common law" took priority over the enactments of the
territorial legislature and that they, federal judges, were not bound by such statutes.
People v. Green. 1 Utah 11, 13-17. Speaking of the territorial legislature, the court stated:
"They have no right, nor indeed can they increase or diminish the powers of the Federal
Courts of this Territory." Id. at 15. With such judicial hostility to the territorial
legislature and, in reading this and other opinions of the territory's federal judiciary, such
enmity for the majority of the territory's citizens that were members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), it can be clearly seen why the common law
and the courts were not highly regarded by the citizenry.
Unlike other states, Utah did not see fit to constitutionalize the common law. Md.
Const, art. 5; Mich. Const, art. 3, § 7; N.Y. Const, art. I, § 14; Wise. Const, art. 14, § 13.
This is probably explained by the fact that the people of Utah, as opposed to the federal
judiciary, did not consider the common law to be applicable to the territory before
statehood. It was not until two years after achieving statehood, and control of their own
courts, that Utah adopted the common law of England. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953)
(unchanged since its enactment in 1898). Even then, the common law was adopted only
"so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the . . . laws of this state

"

Further, Utah law expressly indicates that statutes in derogation of the common law are to

4

be interpreted liberally, at the expense of the common law. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2
(1953).
But under this Court's present interpretation of the open courts clause (Utah Const,
art. I, § 11), the common law is constitutionalized. This is done by the presumption that
the existence of a common law right of action creates a constitutional guarantee under the
Open Courts Clause that such a right of action will be protected against a legislative
decision to alter the common law. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675
(Utah 1985). Because this Court looks to the common law as of the time of the
enactment of the statute in question, the legislature effectively can never alter the
common law, only amend the remedies that are provided. Day v. State of Utah, 1999 UT
46, § 38, 980 P.2d 1171. Not only is this interpretation contrary to the history of the
common law in Utah, but in other states at that time period as well.
The open courts clause is derived from magna carta. Its origins are found in the
provision of magna carta that "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay,
right or justice.'1 Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the
Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions. 74 Or.L.Rev. 1279, 1286 n.38 (1995). The
change to the current language was done by Sir Edward Coke in his battles seeking to
establish the independence of the common law courts of England from royal interference,
stopping, and delaying judicial proceedings. Id. at 1291-95. The language that would
become the open courts clause became important to the early American colonists in their

5

struggles to defend their colonial courts from interference from the crown. Id at 12961308. In these contexts it was seen as supporting the citizens right to be heard in the
courts without having their causes delayed or prevented by interference with the normal
operation of the courts.
While the open courts provision has come to mean different things to different
courts, at the time of Utah's constitutional convention (and the Montana convention
shortly before that in 1889) it was not the legislature that worried the citizens. That was a
"populist era during which distrust of elitist courts ran high

" David Schuman, The

Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1992).
Indeed, court decisions of the time, interpreting other states' open courts provisions
held that this provision was addressed solely to the courts and did not act as a limit on the
powers of the legislature. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 223 S.W. 844, 852 (Tenn. 1920)
(the open courts clause "is a mandate to the judiciary, and was not intended as a limitation
of the legislative branch of the government."); Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 179 P.
499, 503 (Mont. 1919) (while legislature cannot destroy already vested rights, "no one has
a vested right in any rule of the common law." The legislature had the power to alter or
abolish any common law cause of action so long as those rights already accrued were not
impaired.); Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.. 162 P. 938, 942 (Ok. 1917) ("That this was a
mandate to the judiciary and not intended as a limitation upon the legislative branch of the
government seems clear."). Swann v. Kidd. 79 Ala. 431 (Ala. 1885) (purpose of open

6

courts clause was "to assail the existing evil of anciently holding courts in clandestine
sessions, and of paying fines to the king and his officers, for delaying or expediting
lawsuits, and for obtaining justice."); State v. Dubuclet. 28 La. Ann. 698 (La. 1876) (open
courts clause gave the legislature the power to enact judicial remedies, and until such
were created, the courts could not act).
This Court as well originally viewed the open courts clause as solely applying to
the judicial and not the legislative branch.
That provision, however, applies only to judicial questions. It is not meant
thereby that this court may reach out and usurp powers which belong to
another independent and co-ordinate branch of state government.
Salt Lake Citv v. Utah Light & Traction Co.. 52 Utah 210, 227,173 P. 556, 563 (1918).
Indeed, the history of how Utah enacted this provision shows that the remedy
language of the clause was considered by Utah's founding fathers to modify only the
remaining portion of the sentence - "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
As originally proposed, this section read:
All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and
right of justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Proceedings Constitutional Convention 1895 at 304 (emphasis added).
This language could easily be interpreted to be two separate and distinct
provisions. But it was amended upon the motion of Mr. Whitney to remove the

7

underlined words and replace them with the word "which." The purpose of this
amendment was that:
It is to be presumed that the law is right and just, and if it be not it must be
administered anyhow, as long as it is in force and I think that it is
surplusage - the word "which" would be sufficient without the other.
Id. As amended, when considering the reasons for the amendment, the founding fathers
of Utah meant this to be a single provision which continued the historical meaning of the
open courts provision as a limitation upon the judiciary and not upon the legislature.1
This Court's interpretation of the open courts provision of Utah's constitution is
contrary to the history of Utah and of the provision and should be overturned. This
provision is more appropriately considered as a guarantee to litigants of access to the
courts that affords them an opportunity to litigate justiciable controversies. Applied
Medical Technoloeies. Inc.. 2002 UT 18,1J16,44 P.3d 699; Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins.
Co.. 2002 UT 6,1J1J41-42,44 P.3d 663.
II. THIS COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE OPEN COURTS
CLAUSE IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF A MAJORITY OF STATES
There are forty states that have some form of an open courts clause, or right to
remedy clause, in their state constitutions. This number includes New Mexico that reads
its constitutional provision on "inherent rights" as containing an "open courts" or "right to

1

In Crier v. Whitecloud. 496 So.2d 305, 309-10 (La. 1986), the court relied upon
a similar history (that provision would only permit remedies provided by legislative
enactments) in determining that its open courts clause "did not intend to limit the
legislature's ability to restrict causes of action."
8

remedy" provision by implication.2 The applicable constitutional provisions are attached
hereto in the addendum. The exact meaning given to these provisions varies drastically
from state to state. Many have been considered to mandate "access to the courts" and
other rights. For our purposes, the significant question is to what degree these
constitutional provisions have been interpreted as prohibiting the legislative branch of
state government from altering or revoking the common law. On this issue, the states can
be grouped into approximately five categories.
The most restrictive group consists of those states whose courts read their
provisions to prohibit their legislature from abolishing any common law right of action.
These states only permit the courts to alter the common law, the legislature being
permitted only to provide reasonable alternative remedies. There appears3 to be six states
in this group.4
2

The most widely cited count of "open courts" provisions stated that only 39
states had such provisions, including New Mexico. David Schuman, The Right to a
Remedy. 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197,1201 n.25 (1992). The discrepancy is due to Mr.
Schumanfs failure to include Washington in his count. Washington's "Administration of
Justice" constitutional provision has expressly been described as an "open courts"
provision by Washington's courts. 1519-1525 Lakeview Boulevard Condominium
Association v. Apartment Sales Corp.. 6 P.3d 74 (Wa. App. 2000).
3

Those states where it was unclear whether the legislature could, under any
circumstances, completely revoke a common law right were placed in this category.
4

Arizona - Goodman v. Samaritan Health System, 990 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. App.
1999) (legislature cannot abolish common law right of action but can regulate so as to
leave a reasonable alternative remedy); Connecticut - Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688
(Conn. 1998) (legislature is precluded from abolishing or substantially modifying
common law and certain statutory rights that were redressable when State Constitution
9

The next most restrictive group consists of those states that permit the legislature
to alter the common law, not just provide substitute remedies, but only upon the
legislature meeting a very high standard of proof for demonstrating the need for the
change. There are six states in this group as well, but they vary as to what the standard
enforced against the legislature should be. Three states, including Utah, require that the
legislature demonstrate that a clear social evil required the change.5 Ohio requires that
the legislature have a compelling state interest while Wyoming reviews the legislative
revocation of a common law right under the strict scrutiny standard. Mills v. Reynolds.
837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 1992). The final state in this group, Florida, requires that the
legislature make a showing of overpowering public necessity justifying the restriction
with a finding that there is no alternative method of meeting the public necessity.
Yachting Promotions, Inc. v. Broward Yachts. Inc.. 792 So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 2001).

was first adopted unless legislature enacts a reasonable alternative to the enforcement of
that right); Kentucky - Perkins v Northeastern Loe Homes. 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky 1991)
(jural rights of the individual citizens cannot be abridged by any branch of government);
Oregon - Smothers v. Gresham Transfer. Inc.. 23 P.3d 333 (Ore. 2001) (requiring, for
first time, that legislature provide substitute remedy when revoking a common law right court has yet to address whether legislature can ever simply revoke a right); Rhode Island
- Dowd v. Ravner. 655 A.2d 679,683 (R.L 1995) (legislature can put reasonable limits
and burdens on claims, but cannot absolutely prohibit them); South Dakota - Peterson v.
Burns. 635 N.W.2d 556, 571 (S.D. 2001) (legislature cannot completely abolish common
law right to sue, but can put reasonable limits on remedies).
5

Alabama - Barlow v. Humana. Inc.. 495 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Ala. 1986); West
Virginia - Lewis v. Canaan Vallev Resorts. Inc.. 408 S.E.2d 634, 646 (W.Va. 1991).
10

The third group of states also prohibits the legislature from altering the common
law, other than providing reasonable substitute remedies. But this group varies from the
first two in that the prohibition can be overcome by a simple showing that the legislative
enactment is reasonable, without any requirement of clear social evils or overpowering
public necessity. There are three states in this third group.6
A fourth group is made up of those states that fail to read their "open courts"
provisions as a remedy or open courts provision similar to the other states. Rather than
give them this separate meaning, these states use them as replacements for a due process
clause (missing from their state constitutions) and in some cases for an access to the
courts provision. This group consists of the three states of Kansas, North Dakota and
Vermont.
The majority of states fit within the final category. These states, with minor
differences, all hold that their open courts provisions do not prevent their legislatures

6

Minnesota - Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1997) (remedies
clause of Minnesota Constitution does not guarantee redress for every wrong, but instead
enjoins legislature from eliminating those remedies that have vested at common law
without legitimate legislative purpose); New Hampshire - Trovato v. DeVeau. 736 A.2d
1212 (N.H. 1999) (legislative enactment cannot be an arbitrary and discriminatory
infringements on access to the courts); Opinion of the Justices. 628 A.2d 1069 (N.H.
1993) (statutory classifications restricting a right to recover for an injury must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation); Texas - St. Lukes Episcopal Hospital
v- Agbor. 952 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 1997) ("To demonstrate that a statute violates this
constitutional guarantee, a litigant must show 1) that the statute restricts a wellrecognized common law cause of action, and 2) that the restriction is unreasonable or
arbitrary when balanced against the purpose of the statute").
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from abrogating common law causes of action. There are twenty-two states in this
category.7 While some of the states review such legislative enactments to assure they are
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Arkansas - White v. City of Newport. 933 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Ark. 1996) ("These
cases, along with Justice Smith's dissent in Emberson. convince us that the legislature
must be permitted to alter the common law when it stands in the way of a reasonable
public policy objective."); Colorado - Norsbv v. Jensen. 916 P.2d 555, 563-64 (Colo.
App. 1995) (constitutional right of court access does not prevent General Assembly from
changing laws which create rights or from placing valid limitations upon any remedy.
Statute must simply be reasonable and rationally related to the government's legitimate
goal's.); Delaware - Gallegher v. Davis. 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936) (only the
arbitrary and unreasonable abolishment of a right of action to redress to the essential
rights of person or property is prohibited by the constitution); Idaho - Olsen v. J. A.
Freeman Co.. 791 P.2d 1285, 1296 (Idaho 1990) ("It is well established that the 'open
courts' provision governing access to courts of justice does not prohibit the legislature
from abolishing or modifying a common-law right of action."); Illinois - M.E.H. v. L.H..
669 N.E.2d 1228, (111. App. 1996) (although Illinois Constitution prohibits legislature
from arbitrarily eliminating cause of action, legislature may eliminate cause of action if it
is reasonable exercise of legislature's police power in providing for general welfare);
Indiana - Mcintosh v. Melroe Co.. 729 N.E.2d 972, 977 (Ind. 2000) ("because
individuals have 'no vested or property right in any rule of common law,1 the General
Assembly can make substantial changes to the existing law without infringing on citizen
rights"); Louisiana - Crier v. Whitecloud. 496 So.2d 305 (La. 1986) (open courts
provision of State Constitution was not intended to limit legislature's ability to restrict
causes of action or to bar legislature from creating various areas of statutory immunity
from suit); Maine - Maine Medical Center v. Cote. 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Maine 1990)
("The open courts provision means the courts must be accessible to all persons alike
without discrimination, at times and places designated for their sitting, and afford a
speedy remedy for every wrong recognized by law as remediable in a court."); Maryland Gooslin v. State. 752 A.2d 642, 644 (Md. App. 2000); Masschusetts - Plummerv.
Gillieson. 692 N.E.2d 528 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (statutes modifying or abrogating
common law rights do not violate right to remedy by recourse to laws which is guaranteed
by State Constitution); Mississippi - legislature can change common law, but cannot alter
vested rights; Montana - Ross v. Great Falls. 967 P2d 1103,1109 (Mont. 1998) ("We
have held, however, that Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution does not
guarantee a fundamental right to any particular cause of action or remedy and that the
Legislature has the power to alter or abrogate previously available causes of action and
constrict liability."); Nebraska - Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons' Manufacturing Co.. Inc.. 486
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not arbitrary or unreasonable, all begin with the assumption that the legislature has the
right to alter the common law.
In recent years, two states have left the majority position to more severely limit
their legislature's ability to determine what the law should be. With Berry, Utah left the
majority in 1985. Last year, Oregon left the majority with its Smothers decision. At the
same time, Montana and Arkansas have joined the majority in 1989 and 1996

N.W.2d 204, 206 (Neb. 1992) (legislature is free to create and abolish rights so long as no
vested right is disturbed - such actions are constitutional if they are neither unreasonable
nor arbitrary); New Mexico - Truiillo v. Citv of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305, 311 (N.M.
1998) ("A right of access to the courts, does not guarantee the continued existence of a
cause of action or remedy.11); North Carolina - Anderson v. Assimos, 553 S.E.2d 63, 67
(N.C. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly is permitted, under the "due course of law"
language of section 18, to 'define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally
cognizable and those under which it is not.1 Thus, the General Assembly is permitted to
abolish or modify a claim if it has not vested, establish a statute of limitations, establish a
statute of repose, or establish limited immunities for some claims.") (citations omitted);
Oklahoma - Rivas v. Parkland Manor. 12 P.3d 452 (Okla. 2000) (state constitution's
remedy clause does not constrain the legislature, but rather compels the judiciary to be
open to all persons with actionable causes); Pennsylvania - Columbia Gas of Penn.. Inc.
v. Carl E.Baker. Inc. 667 A.2d 404,410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("does not prohibit the
legislature from abolishing a common law right of action without enacting a substitute
means of redress"); South Carolina - Wright v. Colleton County School District 391
S.E.2d 564, 570 (S.C. 1990) (not a guarantee of a full recovery); Tennessee - Harrison v.
Schrader. 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978) (open courts provision "is a mandate to the
judiciary and not a limitation on the Legislature"); Washington -1519-1525 Lakeview
Blvd. Condominium Ass'n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 6 P.3d 74 (Wash. App. 2000)
(legislature can abrogate common law remedies); Wisconsin - Aicher v. Wisconsin
Patients Compensation Fund. 613 N.W.2d 849, 864 (Wis. 2000) ("The legislature's
authority includes the power to define and limit causes of action and to abrogate common
law on policy grounds.").
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respectively. In rejecting its prior decisions that restricted the Arkansas legislature from
altering the common law, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that:
These cases, along with Justice Smith's dissent in Emberson. convince us
that the legislature must be permitted to alter the common law when it
stands in the way of a reasonable public policy objective. The common law
is not a static or a fixed code, forever unchangeable by the representatives
of the people. To read constitutional provisions such as the ones in this
case to say that the common law must remain as it stood in 1874 would
prevent the legislature from adjusting the law to the changes of time and
circumstance. A literal reading of Article 2, § 13, or Article 5, § 32, could
prevent the use of such concepts as comparative fault, or the abolition of
such outdated causes of action as alienation of affection.
White v. City of Newport. 933 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Ark. 1996).
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Meech v. Hilhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d
488 (Mont. 1989) is even more instructive. Like Utah, Montana had originally treated its
open court and remedy clause as a mandate to the courts and not as a restriction on the
legislature. Id. at 491-92. Again like Utah, in the 1980fs, Montana's Supreme Court
altered its interpretation of this provision so as to constrict the ability of the legislature to
amend the common law. Id, at 491. With Meech, the Montana courts returned to their
original interpretation of their open courts clause and once again held that the legislative
branch should be able to alter the common law. The State of Utah urges this Court to
follow Meech and return to the majority position it left with Berry. The State submits that
the legislature should be able to alter the common law so long as its enactments are not
arbitrary or completely unreasonable.
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III. NOT THE CHALLENGED STATUTE, BUT THE OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE AS INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT, IS IN
CONFLICT WITH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PROVISION
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Rather than statutory law taking precedent over common law, as suggested by
Utah's statutes, the open courts clause as currently enforced has the exact opposite result.
The legislative branch of government is bound by the common law with only two very
small exceptions. First, the legislature can do away with a common law cause of action
that it considers inappropriate only if the courts agree that the common law causes a
"clear social or economic evil." Day, 1999 UT 46, ^{40. The second exception permits
the legislature to replace the common law cause of action, or the judicially created
common law remedy, with "an effective and reasonable alternative remedy." IdL Rather
than being the primary determiner of the laws of Utah, the legislative branch can only
amend the common law slightly or remove it when the courts have not already rejected a
part of the common law that has become egregiously out of touch with the current social
and economic reality.
Unlike the legislature, the courts are left free to alter or abolish common law
causes of action as they see fit. Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8, 17 (Utah 1991). No
restrictions similar to those placed on the legislature apparently circumscribe the ability of
the courts to alter or abolish such common law causes of action and their remedies.
Nor is there anything about this Court's interpretation of the Open Courts Clause
that would limit its application to the common law of torts. Rather, the rights that were
15

created at common law, before being replaced by statute, in domestic, contract, water,
commercial, employment, probate, landlord-tenant, real property, intellectual property
and many other areas of law would appear to have just as much claim to protection under
this provision. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assfn v. Bagley. 2000 UT 72
(reassignment of action to new trial judge challenged under open courts clause);
Burgandv v. State of Utah. 1999 UT App 209, 983 P.2d 586 (statute concerning
repayment of general assistance benefits challenged under the Open Courts Clause);
Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998) (criminal law); Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d
1357 (Utah App. 1993) (statute of limitations on extraordinary writ proceedings);
Marvbov v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) (tax law).
Indeed, the Court's current interpretation of the Open Courts Clause is contrary to
its original, much more restrictive interpretation.
That provision, however, applies only to judicial questions. It is not meant
thereby that this court may reach out and usurp powers which belong to
another independent and co-ordinate branch of state government.
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co.. 52 Utah 210, 227,173 P. 556, 563 (1918).
The founding fathers of Utah did not trust the common law. Throughout Utah's
days as a territory, the common law was mistrusted and unaccepted. It took two years
after statehood to finally convince them to adopt the common law, even partially.
Clearly, the founding fathers of Utah did not intend the open courts clause to empower
the common law to be of such importance that the legislature could not alter it by statute.
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The State of Utah submits that this interpretation of the open courts clause is in conflict
with the Separation of Powers provision of the Utah State Constitution. Utah Const, art.
V,§1.
Under our state constitution, it is inappropriate for officers of one branch of
government to exercise functions or powers that are the primary, core, or essential
functions or powers of another branch. In Re Young, 1999 UT 6, If 13, 976 P.2d 581.
"Our cases have indicated that the first clause is only offended when there is an attempt
by one branch to dominate another in that other's proper sphere of action." LI at ^[23.
Under its open courts analysis, this Court comes too close to dominating the legislative
branch. It controls what laws the legislative branch can pass by requiring that no judgemade law be altered in any manner not in keeping with the judicial branch's beliefs as to
what the law ought to be. This precludes the legislative branch from determining what
the law ought to be.
It is "squarely within the legislature's power" to determine what the substantive
law of Utah should be. Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv.. Inc., 903 P.2d 423,425 (Utah 1995).
The State of Utah submits that the open courts clause, as interpreted by Berry, is contrary
to this Court's separation of powers caselaw. "The legislature may regulate, as a matter of
public policy and substantive law, the scope of legal definitions of negligence." Ryan,
903 P.2d at 425.
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The same contradiction is found between Berry and this Court's decision in
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist.. 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533.
Moreover, we urge deference to existing remedies out of respect for
separation of powers1 principles. In general, the legislative branch has the
authority, and in many cases is better suited, to establish appropriate
remedies for individual injuries. By requiring courts to defer to relevant
legislative determinations of appropriate remedies, we respect the
legislature's important role in our constitutional system of government.
IcLat1[24.
It is hard to understand how the legislature has the ability to determine what will or
will not be considered a negligent act, but cannot alter common law rights to sue for
negligence. Or how deference should be given the legislature's determination as to what
would be an appropriate remedy, but requiring that such alterations be only minor or that
a clear social evil force the change upon the legislature. The State of Utah submits that a
conflict exists between this Courts open courts decisions and its separation of powers
decisions.
"The power to declare what the law shall be is legislative. The power to declare
what is the law is judicial." Ritchie v. Richards. 14 Utah 345, 363,47 P. 670, 675 (1896).
While this power must be tempered by the legislature's inability to violate the provisions
of the federal and state constitutions (as well as federal law), it should not also be
subordinate to the common law.
It is wholly within the discretion of the Legislature to determine whether,
concerning any subject, such conditions or such facts and circumstances
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exist as to warrant it to act. It is the sole judge as to whether an exigency,
or such cause exists as requires the enactment of a l a w , . . .
State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P. 388, 389 (1903) (quoting Kimball v.
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 (1899)).
Any interpretation of the open courts clause that limits the legislature from
determining what the law of Utah ought to be, because of what the common law has been
in the past, conflicts with the separation of powers provision of the Utah State
Constitution.
I do not understand that Article I, Sec. 11, of the Constitution of Utah,
prohibits the modification or even the entire removal or destruction of a
common law right by legislative enactment. There is still such a thing as
damnum absque injuria. 8 ...
Naturally most departures from the common law, especially if marked, will
be made by the legislature, but judicial legislation (and such it is regardless
of what jurisprudential terminology may be employed) fills the interstices in
a more gradual process.
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,128,191 P.2d
612, 626 (1948) (Wolfe, J., concurring).
The common law was meant to fill the interstices of the law until such time as the
legislative branch of government saw fit to exercise its authority to determine what the
substantive law of Utah ought to be. It was not meant to be constitutionalized to the
detriment of the legislative branch's ability to perform its core, essential function. Nor

"Loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense;
Dictionary 354 (5th ed. 1979)
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" Black's Law

was it meant to turn control of the legislative function of determining what the law of
Utah should be to the judicial branch. This Court's interpretation of the open courts
clause is in conflict with the mandate of separation of powers and should be overturned.
The open courts clause was not intended to perpetuate and constitutionalize
common law causes of action. Plummer v. Gillieson. 692 N.e.2d 528, 532 (Mass. App.
1998) ("However, art. 11 has never been construed to grant to any person a vested interest
in any rule of law entitling such person to insist that it shall remain unchanged." "Statutes
modifying or abrogating common law rights do not violate art. 11."); Wheeler v. Briggs.
941 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo. 1997) ("legislature has the right to modify the substantive law
to eliminate or restrict causes of action"); Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co.. 791 P.2d 1285,
1296-98 (Idaho 1990) (open courts provision does not prohibit the legislature from
modifying or abolishing a common law right of action); Mayo v. Rouselle Corp.. 375
So.2d 449 (Ala. 1979) (the right to bring an action can be modified, limited or repealed as
the legislature sees fit, except where such cause of action has already accrued); Goldstein
v. Hertz Corp.. 305 N.E.2d 617, 626 (111. App. 1973) ("While the Constitution provides
that every person shall find a remedy for all injuries received, the power and adequacy of
the available remedy rests with the Legislature."); Goldberg v. Musim. 427 P.2d 698
(Colo. 1967) (open courts clause did not prevent the legislature from repealing the
common law at any time it chose to do so); Vogts v. Guerrette. 351 P.2d 851, 854 (Colo.
1960) ("As stated by the Alabama court 'this provision does not undertake to preserve
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existing duties against legislative change made before the breach occurs.1"). It should be
interpreted as providing procedural and not substantive rights. Craftsman Builder's
Supply v.Butler Mfg.. 1999 UT 18, ffi[146-54,974 P.2d 1194 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); Stouffer v. Ward. 959 P.2d 985,988 (Okl. Civ. App. 1998)
(remedy provision intended to guarantee judiciary would be open and available to resolve
disputes, not guarantee results); Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth. Inc.. 821 S.W.2d 822, 83233 (Mo. 1992) (open courts prohibits preventing the use of the courts through invalid
conditions precedent to suit, but does not prevent the legislature from changing the
common law, even eliminating causes of action).
Other courts have recognized that an interpretation of their open courts clause
similar to that in Berry would violate the separation of powers.
The interpretation of Article II, Section 16, called for by Meech
would prevent the legislature and the people through the initiative process
from restricting or modifying the common law relative to injuries or person,
property, or character. Only this Court's reasoning (good or bad), however,
would restrict this Court's own lawmaking function. Our decision to limit a
cause of action would withstand the strict scrutiny mandated by Article II, §
16; we would be applying the test. But a similar decision made by the
legislature could be subject to much closer scrutiny. This Court would act
as the ultimate authority in a vast, expanding, and ever changing field of
law governing important social and economic rights and duties. It could
exclude the legislature from deciding: What are injuries to an individual's
person, property, or reputation; what wrongs are actionable; what remedies
are available; and what redress will be given.

21

Meech v. Hillhaven West. Inc.. 776 P.2d 488, 500 (Mont. 1989). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion in Freezer Storage. Inc. v. Armstrong Cork
C a , 382 A.2d 715, 721 (Pa. 1978).
This Court would encroach upon the Legislature's ability to guide the
development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule
enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred
by the courts. To do so would be to place certain rules of the "common
law" and certain non-constitutional decisions of courts above all change
except by constitutional amendment. Such a result would offend our notion
of the checks and balances between the various branches of government,
and of the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law.
In rejecting the application of Berry, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that
"Many courts have expressed concern that a strict interpretation of the open court clause
would restrict the legislature's ability to enact new laws and repeal old laws and that such
restrictions could freeze common law rights in perpetuity." Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co.,
791 P.2d 1285, 1297 (Idaho 1990).
Vested rights in common law causes of action are already protected against
retroactive legislation. Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6, 9-10 (Utah App.
1994). To protect an abstract right, not yet vested because no tort has yet been
committed, against alteration or deletion by the legislature is contrary to the separation of
powers doctrine. The legislature's decision to alter the substantive law of Utah
prospectively does not violate anyone's rights.
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IV. BERRY VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
TREATING THE LEGISLATURE AS AN INFERIOR TRIBUNAL
When reviewing legislative enactments under the uniform operation of laws
provision of our state constitution, this Court determines if "the classification is
reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether
there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes.11
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State of Utah. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). In
such cases, this Court only considers the legislative history for the purpose of determining
the legislative objective behind the statute. Zissi v. State Tax Com'n, 842 P.2d 848, 856
(Utah 1992). Indeed, no actual proof that the legislature had a particular purpose in mind
is required, "it is enough that they may be reasonably imputed to the legislative body."
Blue Cross. 779 P.2d at 641; Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv.. Inc., 903 P.2d 423,427 (Utah
1995).
In contrast to this manner of reviewing legislative actions, this Court overturns a
jury verdict after a judicial trial "only if, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the appellate court
concludes that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict." Eddy v. Albertson's
Inc., 2001 UT 88, ^flO, 34 P3d 781. In a similar manner, quasi-judicial administrative
decision-making is reviewed to determine if the agency's factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence. WWC Holding Co.. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 2001
UT23,U2,44P.3d714.
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But under its open courts decisions, this Court has sometimes treated the Utah
State Legislature as an inferior tribunal. Instead of reviewing legislative enactments
based upon their reasonableness as public policy, this Court has rejected them because
there was insufficient "evidence" before the legislature to support the challenged statutes.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 681-83 (Utah 1985) (rejecting statute of
repose due to lack of evidence, especially lack of current problem in state of Utah as
opposed to national concerns); D a w . State of Utah. 1999 UT 46, Tf46, 980 P.2d 1171
("The problem identified by the sponsor of the amendment was a 'rash' of 'frivolous
lawsuits' in California. No evidence was presented showing that Utah had experienced a
similar rash of such frivolous lawsuits."); Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 583-88 (Utah
1993) (rejecting legislative enactment because no "evidence" of current problems in Utah
but only on a national basis or in other states);
And yet other decisions only look to the reasonableness of the policy objectives
that are behind the legislative enactment. Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 560-63
(Utah 1997) (finding objectives behind the no-fault statute to be adequate); Craftsman
Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18,1ffl20-22, 974 P.2d 1194 (looking
only to legislative objectives and requiring party challenging statute to submit evidence
that the objectives would not be met by statute).
The legislative process is very different from the judicial one. While there may be
some recorded history of a legislative enactment, other statutes are duly passed by the
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legislature without any "evidence" being recorded as to the reasons why it was considered
necessary or appropriate. The State of Utah submits that the Utah State Legislature is not
an inferior tribunal whose decisions can, or should, be reviewed based upon the evidence
it had before it when it made a decision.
While it is proper for the courts to consider the reasonableness (or higher standard
in appropriate cases) of the statute as enacted, it is improper to expect a legislative body
to act like a judicial one. The legislature does not take "evidence" as does a judicial body.
It is required to determine public policy questions. "The power to declare what the law
shall be is legislative. The power to declare what is the law is judicial." Ritchie v.
Richards. 14 Utah 345, 363, 47 P. 670, 675 (1896). By its very nature, setting public
policy means dealing with matters that have yet to come to fruition but that have raised
concerns over what might happen in the near future.
To require that the legislature have before it judicially acceptable "evidence" of a
crisis within the State of Utah before it can act is to prevent a separate branch of
government from performing fully its function. It would be the duty of the Utah
Legislature to seek to prevent a crisis, where possible, rather than to wait until the
compelling evil has befallen the State of Utah. Where sister states have, or are, suffering
a crisis, it is reasonable for the Utah Legislature to act in an effort to avoid the same
calamity from striking the citizens of Utah. While a judicial body must await a justiciable
controversy, the duty of the Legislature of Utah is to look to the future needs of the state,
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be they in transportation, public education, or tort reform. The State of Utah submits that
it is inappropriate to treat the legislature like an inferior tribunal and require that it have
"evidence" of record to support its public policy decisions.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the State of Utah as amicus curiae asks this Court to
affirm the trial court's decision upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 7814-7.1 and its decision that the statute mandated the reduction of the jury verdict and
judgment for noneconomic damages to the statutorily prescribed amount of $250,000.
THE STATE OF UTAH, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
DESIRES ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED
OPINION IN THIS MATTER
The State of Utah, as amicus curiae, respectfully urges the Court to hold oral
argument in this matter. The Amicus Curiae will, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, seek permission to participate in any such oral argument. The
questions raised in this appeal are of such importance that oral argument and a published
opinion are necessary for the guidance of the lower courts of Utah and the government.
Respectfully submitted this

/ 7

^day of July, 2002.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah, Amicus Curiae
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ADDENDUM "A

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 [Courts open - Redress of injuries]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. V, § 1 [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953) Common law adopted.
The common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict with,
the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this
state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted,
and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953) Statutes in derogation of common law
liberally construed - Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance
between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same
matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1 (1986) Limitation of award of noneconomic
damages in malpractice actions.
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may
recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience.
In no case shall the amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss
exceed $250,000. This limitation does not affect awards of punitive damages
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OTHER STATES CONSTITUTIONAL OPEN COURTS AND
RIGHT TO REMEDY PROVISIONS
ALABAMA - Ala. Const, art. I, § 13
§ 13. Courts to be open; remedies for all injuries; impartiality of justice.
That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.
ARIZONA - Ariz. Const, art. I, § 11 & art. XVIII, § 6
§11. Administration of justice
Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.
§ 6. Recovery of damages for injuries
The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and
the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.
ARKANSAS - Ark. Const, art. II, § 13
§13 Redress of wrongs.
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he
may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and
without purchase, completely, and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformably to the laws.
COLORADO - Colo. Const, art. II, § 6
§ 6. Equality of justice
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for
every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered
without sale, denial or delay.
CONNECTICUT - Conn. Const, art. I, § 10
§ 10. Right of redress for injuries
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
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DELAWARE - Del. Const, art. I, § 9
§ 9 Courts shall be open; remedy for injury; suits against State.
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him or her in his or
her reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due
course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the
law of the land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense. Suits may be
brought against the State, according to such regulations as shall be made by law.
FLORIDA - Fla. Const, art. I, § 21
§ 21. Access to courts
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay.
IDAHO - Idaho Const, art. I, § 18
§18 Justice to be freely and speedily administered.
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for
every injury of person, property or character, and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.
ILLINOIS - 111. Const, art. I, § 12
§ 12. Right to Remedy and Justice
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice
by law, freely, completely, and promptly.
INDIANA - Ind. Const, art. I, § 12
§ 12 Courts open; remedy by due course of law; administration of justice
All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be
administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and
without delay.
KANSAS - Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 18
§ 18. Justice without delay.
All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.
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KENTUCKY - Ky. Const., Bill of Rights, § 18
§ 14 Right of Judicial Remedy for Injury; Speedy Trial
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
LOUISIANA - La. Const, art. I, § 22
§ 22. Access to Courts
All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due
process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay,
for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.
MAINE - Me. Const, art. I, § 19
§ 19. Right of redress for injuries
Every person, for an injury inflicted on the person or the person's reputation,
property or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice
shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly
and without delay.
MARYLAND - Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, § 19
Article 19. Relief for injury to person or property
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have
remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the Land.
MASSACHUSETTS - Mass. Const, pt. I, art. 11
Art. XI. Remedy by recourse to the laws; obtaining of right and justice freely, completely
and promptly
Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being
obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay;
conformably to the laws.
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MINNESOTA - Minn. Const, art. I, § 8
§ 8. Redress of injuries or wrongs
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
conformable to the laws.
MISSISSIPPI - Miss. Const, art. Ill, § 24
§ 24. Open courts; remedy for injury
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.
MISSOURI - Mo. Const, art. I, § 14
§ 14. Open courts—certain remedies—justice without sale, denial or delay
That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay.
MONTANA - Mont. Const, art. II, § 16
§ 16. The administration of justice
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for
every injury of person, property, or character. No person shall be deprived of this full
legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable
except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired him if such
immediate employer provides coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this
state. Right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.
NEBRASKA - Neb. Const, art. I, § 13
§ 13. Justice administered without delay; Legislature; authorization to enforce mediation
and arbitration.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him or her in his or
her lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law and
justice administered without denial or delay, except that the Legislature may provide for
the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, and other forms of dispute
resolution which are entered into voluntarily and which are not revocable other than upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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NEW HAMPSHIRE - N.H. Const, pt. I, art. 14
Art. 14. Legal Remedies to be Free, Complete, and Prompt.
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right
and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any
denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
NEW MEXICO - N.M. Const, art. II, § 4
§ 4 Inherent rights.
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable
rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and
happiness.
NORTH CAROLINA - N.C. Const, art. I, § 18
§18. Courts shall be open
All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall
be administered without favor, denial, or delay.
NORTH DAKOTA - N.D. Const, art. I, § 9
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought
against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the
legislative assembly may, by law, direct.
OHIO - Ohio Const, art. I, § 16
§ 16 Redress for Injury; Due Process
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have
justice administered without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in
such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law
OKLAHOMA - Okla. Const, art. II, § 6
§ 6. Courts of justice open-Remedies for wrongs-Sale, denial or delay
The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and
certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or
reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or
prejudice.
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OREGON - Or. Const, art. I, § 10
§10. Administration of justice.
No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without
purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course
of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.—
PENNSYLVANIA - Pa. Const, art. I, § 11
§11. Courts to be open; suits against the Commonwealth
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may
by law direct.
RHODE ISLAND - R.I. Const, art. I, § 5
§ 5 Entitlement to remedies for injuries and wrongs - Right to justice.
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to
the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one's person, property, or
character. Every person ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase,
completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.
SOUTH CAROLINA - S.C. Const, art. I, § 9
§ 9. Courts; speedy remedy.
All courts shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy therein for
wrongs sustained
SOUTH DAKOTA - S.D. Const, art. VI, § 20
§ 20 Courts open -- Remedy for injury.
All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him in his property,
person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice,
administered without denial or delay.
TENNESSEE - Tenn. Const, art. I, § 17
§ 17. Remedies in courts, suits against state
That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such
manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.
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TEXAS - Tex. Const, art. I, § 13
§ 13. Excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual punishment; remedy by due course of
law
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law.
VERMONT - Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 4 & ch. II, § 28
Art. 4 Remedy at law secured to all
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to
the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which one may receive in person, property or
character; every person ought to obtain right and justice, freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; completely and without any denial; promptly and without delay;
comformably to the laws.
§ 28 Courts of justice
The Courts of Justice shall be open for the trial of all causes proper for their
cognizance; and justice shall be therein impartially administered, without corruption or
unnecessary delay.
WASHINGTON - Wash. Const, art. I, § 10
§ 10. Administration of Justice
Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.
WEST VIRGINIA - W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 17
§ 17. Courts Open to All — Justice Administered Speedily
The courts of this State shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him,
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law; and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
WISCONSIN - Wis. Const, art. I, § 9
§ 9. Remedy for wrongs
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely,
and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay, conformably to the laws.
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WYOMING - Wyo. Const, art. I, § 8
§ 8 Courts open to all; suits against state.
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or
property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits maybe brought
against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.
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